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Islam in Ingushetia and Chechnya
Stephen R. Bowers1
James Madison University

Yavus Akhmadov2
Academy of Science of the Chechen Republic

Ashley Ann Derrick3
William R. Nelson Institute, James Madison University
Building on an earlier article entitled Islam in the North Caucasus, by
Bowers at al., published in Volume 26 (2001) of this journal, the authors
analyze the historical evolution of Islamic terrorism in Russia, Chechnya,
and more recently Ingushetia.
Key Words: Russia; Chechnya; Ingushetia; Islamization; Christinaity; Terrorism;
Wahhahbites; Turkic peoples; North Caucasus.

Introduction
The Islamization of Ingushetia and Chechnya began in the 19th
century and, although interrupted by the Soviet experience, has resumed
in the Northern Caucasus. Soviet dominance in the region suppressed
religion so excessively that by the 1980s Islam existed as little more than
a household tradition and a mark of ethnic identity. However, following
the relaxation of the Gorbachev years and the subsequent breakdown of
the Soviet Union, two basic forms of Islam emerged in the Northern
Caucasus. One is regarded as the traditional Islamic faith, whereas the
other, Wahhabism, the new, largely politicized form of Islam, is more
radical.
The Wahhabites, originally active in Dagestan, later gained popularity in Chechnya and other parts of the Northern Caucasus as the local
population, especially in the poor highlands, began to fall into poverty
following the collapse of the Soviet economic system. Currently, most
Wahhabite or revivalist Muslim groups exist as isolated enclaves. A long
history of conflict in the region, combined with radical religious rhetoric,
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suggests Wahhabite youth pose likely candidates for the next generation
of guerrilla war leaders, mirroring the ideals of Islamic radicals of the
Middle East. It is already difficult for authorities in the region to
suppress illegal activity, because the Wahhabite enclaves are often better
armed than the local police.
Wahhabism is more accurately referred to as Salafite Islam (from
the Arabic as-salaf, ancestors), a term used in the Islamic world in
reference to revivalists wanting to restore old values. It embraces a more
political than religious theological framework, transforming it into a
potentially violent force, threatening the stability of the region.
Background
In the Northern Caucasus, almost every social, political and ideological issue has an Islamic component. The Muslim faith has become an
inherent part of the regional ethnic identity, permeating the mentality
and behavior of peoples living in the region. The northeastern part of
the Caucasus, including Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia, has a
stronger religious tradition, while the northwestern Caucasus, primarily
the Adigei and Turkic people, did not embrace Islam with the same
fervor. Additionally, Islam by definition has social and political
dimensions. Therefore, the resumption of Islamization is marked by the
emergence of Islamic political trends.4
The small, nominally autonomous Republic of Ingushetia covers
3600 square kilometers, has a native population of 300,000 and about as
many Chechen refugees. The Ingush and neighboring Chechens are
ethnically and linguistically similar. However, their religious cultures
vary. The Ingush embraced Islam later and with less intensity than the
Chechens. Also, unlike Chechnya, there is no tradition of militant Islam
in Ingushetia – a factor that has been favorable in relations with
Russians.5
Ingushetia is experiencing a revival of religiosity and boasts over 400
mosques, most constructed in recent years. More than 1,000 Ingush
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receive a religious education each year, either in Ingushetia or abroad.
The Muftia Albogachiev, who maintains good relations with neighboring
republics, directs spiritual leadership. The Ingush, like most Chechens,
are Muslim-Sunis. Yet, unlike in Chechnya, the spiritual leaders of
Ingushetia do not claim direct participation in the state governance and
have not demanded the introduction of Shariat law.
Typically, the Ingush are associated with one of the two traditional
orders of Islam. The Naqshbandi order is represented in Ingushetia by
the brotherhood of Deni Arsanov, a highly respected figure whose
descendants are held in equally high regard. The son of Sheikh Ilias
Arsanov left Chechnya in 1996 because of conflicts with Ichkeria
authorities and is currently residing in Ingushetia.
The Qadiri order in Ingushetia is primarily associated with KuntaHadji Kishiev and has close relations with its members’ co-religionists in
Chechnya. In the nineteenth century the brotherhood of Batal-Hadji
appeared in the Ingush village of Surhahi. Members of this brotherhood
strictly observe their Charter. They are well disciplined and united under
the leadership of the descendants of Batal-Hadji.
Learning from the tragic example of Chechnya, which suffered so
much from religious disputes, the Ingush Muslims have managed to
resist ideological and dogmatic extremism. The Ministry of Internal
Affairs of Ingushetia was given responsibility for the suppression of
Wahhabism and in 1998 it was formally banned in Ingushetia. Wahhab
emissaries were expelled and theological schools allied with them were
closed. Furthermore, though Chechen rebel groups have attempted to
use Ingushetia as a sanctuary while planning military strategy against
Russian forces, Ingush security forces have been deployed to drive out
the Chechens and those suspected of supporting them.6
Although some young Ingush citizens, motivated by a sense of religious obligation, participated in military activities during the first
Chechen war, they avoided involvement during the second conflict.
Their opposition to the second war was a result of their rejection of
Wahhabism and the slave-trade often associated with it. Chechen
6
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Wahhabites were considered expert hostage-takers, using Urus-Martan
as their center for trade. Hostages were divided according to wealthy
and expensive or poor and cheap. Soldiers were categorized as cheap
and therefore enslaved. Prisoners were often tortured, and were the
subjects of knife-throwing target practice for their captors. Islamic
conversion was encouraged as a means to spare oneself, though the
kidnappers did not always keep their promise.7 Many Ingush families
suffered from Wahhabite enslavement.
Regional turbulence continues to affect Ingushetia’s development
and represents a significant threat to the republic’s stability. In 2004,
Ingushetian President Murat M. Zyazikov, a former KGB officer
regarded as a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, was the
target of an assassination attempt by a suicide bomber who drove a car
into the president’s armored Mercedes on a highway near Magas, the
capital of Ingushetia. The powerful explosion killed one of his guards,
but the president received only minor injuries.8
Northern Ossetia, Kabardin-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, and
Adygeiya are located in the central and northern-west regions of the
North Caucasus, where the population adheres to the ethical norms of
mountaineers, not to religious values. Unofficial Sufi brotherhoods
never played a significant role in this region. By the 1970s religious
traditions such as circumcision, having a mullah’s blessing for all
marriages, and others had been eliminated.
In the 1990s, a new phenomenon of spiritual life related to interest
in Muslim values and the great past appeared in the national republics
of the Central and Northern-West Caucasus. Religious governance
headed by muftis was introduced throughout the region and Islamic
educational institutions, including higher educational facilities, were
opened. Most were created with encouragement and funding from
abroad. Mosques were restored in almost all the communities of
Balkaria, Cherkessia, and Ossetia. Eight mosques were opened in
Karachayevo-Cherkessia, even though the Muslims account for only half
7
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of the total population. The remaining half embraces Orthodox
Christianity.
Islamization in these republics occurred as radical Islamic organizations worked to fill the vacuum created by the disappearance of
Communist ideology. The Daavat groups popularized Wahhabism and
recruited youth from the mountain regions into military groups. From
1996 to 1999 dozens of young people from Balkaria and Karachay were
trained in camps near Sejen-Yurt and were active participants during
the first Chechen war. These camps were run by a young Saudi Arabian
named Samir Saleh Abdullah Al-Suwailem, but better known as Ibn-ulKhattab. Khattab, who joined the fighting in Afghanistan when he was
only seventeen, had been an associate of Osama bin Laden and Taliban
leader Mullah Omar.
Resumed Islamization has become a fact of life in the entire North
Caucasus region. Islam is regaining status primarily among the peoples
who suffered from deportation during World War II, especially among
Balkars and Karachayevos. Many elements of Sufi practice have been
restored in the communities populated by those who have returned from
internal exile.
The hostility of traditional believers toward the Wahhabites has
grown stronger because the Wahhabites, who perceive only their
traditions as legitimate, do not recognize the customs and traditions of
the mountaineers. In Kabardin-Balkaria, the fight against Wahhabism
has been determined and often bitter. Authorities eliminated the most
ardent armed extremists and expelled or disbanded a number of
suspicious organizations financed from abroad.
There are about 2000 Wahhabites in Karachay, including Muslim
radicals who have not formally embraced the Wahhabite faith. However,
it was Karachay Wahhabites who were recruited to commit terrorist acts
in Moscow and Volgodonsk.
Leaders of Christian Orthodox and Muslim communities deny there
has been a religious intrusion into the North Caucasus. This denial is
presented as an explanation of why the Russian Orthodox Church did
not give a special blessing to either the first or the second Chechen war.
While the Orthodox Church disapproves of civilian mistreatment, it has
taken no official public position.
Volume 29 Number 4, Winter 2004
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Wahhabism and the Chechen Conflict
The impact of religion on conflict in the North Caucasus is most
notable in Chechnya. In contemporary Chechnya, as noted above,
traditional Islam is challenged by Wahhabism. Named after its founder
Al-Wahhab, the Wahhabite movement emerged in the eighteenth
century. Wahhab claimed Islam had become distorted and called upon
his followers to purify it and return to Islam’s fundamentals. Now
Wahhabism appears throughout the Middle East, particularly Saudi
Arabia, where it is accepted as the official ideology of the royal family.
However, Wahhabism in Chechnya (as well as in Tajikistan), does not
relate directly to Wahhabism as it is understood by Sunni Muslims in the
Middle Eastern countries. Although the main idea is the same – the
purification of Islam from both pagan and modern influences – Chechen
Wahhabism has characteristics that distinguish it from the religious
values and practices of Saudi Arabia.
The Wahhabite movement has deep implications for Chechnya’s
religious, social and political life. Its call to purify Islam challenges
Chechnya’s traditional Islam, which is heavily influenced by the local
system of beliefs and norms, and by an elaborate structure of religious
communities and brotherhoods. In fact, Wahhabism attempts to return
the population to what it views as original Islam, rejecting Chechnya’s
unique historical experience. Crucial to this transformation is the
application of rules, norms and practices accepted among the radicals in
the Middle East to Chechen social and political life. Hence, traditionalists (who constitute the overwhelming majority of the population)
associate Wahhabism with foreign influences that threaten their
religious customs and identity.9 For their part, the Wahhabites view the
supporters of traditional Islam as backward sectarians who have
distorted the Islamic faith. Since the early 1990s, both the conflict
between fundamentalists and traditionalists, and significant divisions
among Sufi sects, have had a profound impact on Chechen politics and
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the on-going Russian military operations in the region.
During the 1994-1996 military operation, Russian federal troops
were a common enemy for most Sufi brotherhoods and Wahhabites.
Both mobilized the population against the federal government and
temporarily put aside their differences. Most Chechen leaders identified
themselves with Sufi brotherhoods to secure the support of their
members; for example, President Dudayev declared that he belonged to
the Kunta-Hadji brotherhood. In this wartime environment, the
Wahhabites managed to strengthen their position in Chechnya. Money,
armament and fighters provided by radical counterparts from abroad
were crucial to the Chechen resistance against the Russian federal
troops and enabled Wahhabites to become an influential group in the
republic. Relations between Sufi brotherhoods and Wahhabites
deteriorated dramatically after the end of the 1994-1996 campaign, and
their religious differences spilled over into politics.
In the political realm, traditionalists and fundamentalists disagreed
over the organization and Russian policy of the Chechen state. Sufi
Muslims advocated a secular state that would preserve Chechnya’s
traditional social structure and its unique Islamic culture. Their position
on the future of Russian-Chechen relations was not uniform, and ranged
from calls for independence to the development of a special status
within the Russian Federation. There is no evidence that Sufi brotherhoods had any interest in protracting the conflict or extending it beyond
Chechnya’s borders. Wahhabites were determined to build a pure
Muslim society that would be organized and regulated according to the
Shariat law (as opposed to adat – traditional norms developed in
Chechnya before the adoption of Islam). A Just (fair) Islamic order, as
they believe existed in the times of the Arabic caliphate, became
Chechnya’s religious extremists’ goal. Furthermore, they aimed to create
a larger Islamic state in the Northern Caucasus to encompass Dagestan,
Ingushetia and possibly other Russian regions. Since those regions chose
to stay in the Federation and their predominantly Muslim population
did not sympathize with fundamentalism, the only means of achieving
this objective was aggression against Russia and a declaration of gazavat
(or jihad) – holy war – against non-believers. In Dagestan in the early
1990s, the population rejected the ideals of Wahhabism and the
Volume 29 Number 4, Winter 2004
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leadership declared it “undesirable” in the republic. In June 2000, an act
of the Dagestan parliament banned all Wahhabite organizations.
Thus, Wahhabites challenged the official Chechen leadership
(President Aslan Maskhadov and his supporters) and emerged as a
serious threat to the foundations of Chechen society. As a result,
officials in Grozny became more and more critical of Wahhabism in
their statements and declarations. However, Maskhadov took no
decisive action, fearing it might exacerbate the situation in the republic.
Violent confrontation between traditionalists and radicals occurred
when Wahhabites clashed with Sufi Muslims in May 1998 in Gudermes
and Urus-Martan and again in Gudermes in July 1998, when approximately 50 people were killed in one day’s fighting. Fearing fundamentalists would destabilize the situation in the republic and attempt to
rebel against Grozny, Maskhadov declared a state of emergency,
dissolved and disarmed the Shariat Guards and Islamic regiment, and
exiled the especially troublesome and violent Ibn-ul-Khattab.10 On July
23, 1998, there was an assassination attempt on Maskhadov in Grozny,
believed to have been organized by Wahhabites. Observers in Russia,
Georgia, and Azerbaijan, all of whom were directly affected by this
instability, agreed the republic was on the brink of civil war.
Despite a relatively strong position, Wahhabites were not able to
assert their influence throughout the republic, much less impose their
ideology on its entire territory. However, they went ahead with their
plans to occupy neighboring Russian regions and invaded Dagestan in
August 1999. Although members of Sufi brotherhoods may have
participated in the invasion, the Russian government blamed Wahhabites for conceptualizing and implementing it. Khattab, a person widely
identified with the Islamic militants, encouraged rebel leader Shamil
Basayev to send a battalion of Chechen fundamentalists into Dagestan.
11
Subsequent investigations, and pleas of innocence on the part of
Grozny officials who condemned the aggression in Dagestan, further
convinced Moscow that fundamentalists had begun a jihad that was
resulting in a loss of control over the situation in Chechnya. Russian
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authorities viewed the Wahhabites as a major threat to (1) the peace
and stability of the Northern Caucasus and (2) to the territorial integrity
of the Russian Federation. The invasion of Dagestan and the Wahhabite
plan to wage a holy war against Russia until a “purely” Islamic state was
created in the southern territories prompted the federal government to
begin a military operation in Chechnya immediately following the defeat
of those who attacked Dagestan.
As federal troops advanced into Chechnya, however, they had to
fight not only Islamic extremists, but some members of Sufi brotherhoods who for various reasons, as in 1994-1996, opposed Russian
control. Unlike fundamentalists, Sufi Muslims do not fight for a
religious cause and tend to have more reasonable positions on issues.
Their dissatisfaction with the situation in the republic from 1996-1999
led them to cooperate with the Russians in a number of instances. As a
result, many of the Sufi communities negotiated with the federal
representatives and avoided armed conflict. Some openly supported the
military operation and organized volunteer troops to fight on the
Russian side against both Sufi and Wahhabite rebels.
Therefore, Sufi communities’ opposition to the Russians or
Wahhabites depends on traditions, history, kinship, religious idiosyncrasies and even geographic position. The population in the mountains is
generally perceived as very militant and hostile even to fellow Chechens
from the flatland, whereas the northern part of the republic has been
loyal to Moscow.
On the other hand, Wahhabites are almost by definition inclined to
resist Russian military operations and the subsequent restoration of
peaceful life and order. Therefore, the Russian government, the military
and the population at large views Wahhabites and any other radical
Islamic movement as the greatest obstacle to the stabilization of
Chechnya. When they choose to cooperate, traditional Sufi groups are
Moscow’s most valuable partners in the struggle against extremism.
Accordingly, the federal government strives to support traditional
Chechen institutions: teips, tukhums, virds and tarikats. Russian officials
hope that they will help prevent the spread of extremism and facilitate a
return to normal life.
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The Wahhabite Perspective
Chechen society has a complex structure and is fragmented along
the lines of kinship and religious identification. Several basics can be
summarized. First, all politics are local and driven by narrowly-defined
interests of clans or brotherhoods. A nationwide movement, whether
pro-Russian or anti-Russian, is not likely to emerge as long as the
present tendencies persist. The roots of and the solutions for the
Chechen crisis lie in interactions among different factions of society, not
in national interests or aspirations of any one ethnic group. Second, Sufi
brotherhoods play an important role in mobilizing public support for or
against the central government or any other authority; their decisions
and actions are best explained individually. Third, religious extremism
does exist in Chechnya and for various reasons is accepted among a
certain portion of the population. It calls for the redesign of Chechen
society in accordance with the principles of fundamentalist Islam and
the conquest of neighboring lands, thus antagonizing traditionalists
within Chechnya and the federal government. The confrontation
between Chechens and the Sufi Muslims has been one of the most
dramatic aspects of the Chechen crisis. Fourth, Wahhabite violence, and
the events in Daghestan, prompted the federal government’s military
response. Fifth, since Wahhabites are currently the greatest threat to
Moscow’s interests, the federal government has supported traditional
Chechen institutions, including religious brotherhoods, with the
assumption they will effectively resist foreign radicals, though they often
deny Russian authority as well.
Mr. Albert Avduev, a member of the Chechen diaspora who until
recently worked in Moldova as an oil engineer, has lectured on the
Wahhabite perspective. Avduev is a former member of the Chechen
parliament who privately describes himself as a secret Wahhabite but
who is very open in his efforts to promote a better understanding of the
principles of those people who wish to cleanse Islam of its alien
characteristics.12
Avduev prefers not to use the term Wahhabite, insisting the term
itself is a result of Russian propaganda. He maintains that Russian
12
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historians have distorted both Islam and the movement that seeks to
reform Islamic practice. For Avduev, Russian colonization led to a
situation in which both the Islamic faith and Islamic society were
corrupted. The flight of Russian serfs from the restrictive Czarist
administrators was a significant factor that enabled Russians to
penetrate the Caucasus as well as other portions of southern Russia.
Avduev explains this process of distortion as one driven by extreme
Russian prejudice against all people of the North Caucasus, Chechens in
particular. The Russian mass media, he argues, have long presented the
Caucasus people as being more like orangutans than humans. Russia’s
aversion to the people of Chechnya and Daghestan led to a deliberate
policy of genocide as early as the nineteenth century. Religious traitors
and Russians, he maintains, worked to distort the true Islamic faith.
According to Avduev, a holy war against non-believers was the only
option for devout Muslims. With the weakening of Communist rule, the
true believers of the North Caucasus were able to work to restore their
legitimate rights. Russian authorities, Avduev insists, have undertaken a
renewed genocidal campaign to prevent the restoration of a true Islamic
society in the North Caucasus.13
Conclusion
Although Islam has been instrumental in the development of the
North Caucasus region, the peoples living there do not identify with any
single sect or doctrine. Historically, the Islam of this region was suffused
with many pre-Islamic customs and traditions. The North Caucasian
federation forged by Shamil, Imam of Daghestan, waged a holy war
(ghazavat) against the old ways in order to impose Islamic law throughout the Imanate and against the Russian Empire, and also in order to
preserve its independence. Shamil, a Sufi of the Naqshbandi order,
demanded great sacrifices from his peoples but was eventually conquered by the Russians.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, another Sufi order
took root in the North Caucasus. This was the more pacifistic Qadiri
order founded by Kunta-Hadj. The Qadiri participated along with the
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Naqshbandi in various insurrections during the twilight of the Russian
Empire and throughout the Soviet period. By the time Chechnya
unilaterally declared its independence in 1991, the Qadiri rite had
become the dominant form of Sufism in Chechnya.
During the last decade, the fundamentalist Wahhabite movement,
which enthusiastically supports Chechen independence, has become a
major regional force despite numerous efforts by the Qadiri Chechens
to suppress its influence. This official suppression has resulted in the
emergence of a clandestine Wahhabite network supported from abroad,
particularly from the Middle East and Afghanistan. Increased foreign
influence was dramatically revealed when Chechen rebels seized a
Moscow theater in October 2002. An Arabic language banner heralded
the Chechens’ demands and Chechen women dressed in the manner of
Arabic women. This shocking scene underscored the increasingly
widespread assumption that Islamic terrorism had replaced the
Chechens long-standing demands for independence from Russian
authority.14
The Chechen diaspora, which has played a major supporting role in
the modern Middle East, especially in the former Ottoman Empire and
successor states such as Iraq and Jordan, has provided aid and soldiers
to support their Chechen cousins. The money, armaments, and soldiers
(mujahideen) provided by various radical Islamic groups from abroad
have also played a major role in strengthening Chechen resistance.
After the first Chechen war (1994-1996), religious differences between the Sufi movements and the Wahhabites began to have a political
impact. While Sufi Muslims called for the creation of a secular state that
would preserve traditional social patterns, the Wahhabites demanded a
purification of Islam and the eradication of local customs that have
tainted and undermined pure Islam.
The Russian Federation was greatly humiliated by its loss of the first
Chechen war through the peace brokered by General Alexander Lebed
in 1996. Many important politicians and military officers longed for an
opportunity to avenge this loss and regain national honor. The
14
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Wahhabite effort to spread a pan-Islamic fundamentalist revival by
invading Dagestan in 1999 gave Russia the opportunity it sought to
redeem itself militarily.
Within Chechnya, a divided people are confronted by two polar
choices: either to work within the Russian Federation and survive
physically or to sacrifice the nation upon the altar of jihad. Other
Caucasian peoples (Circassians, Balkars, Ingush, Avars and Kumyks,
among others) have opted to stay within the Russian Federation. Only
the Chechens seem unable to resolve their differences in favor of
coexistence.
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